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Introduction
(1) As digital networks expand, accelerate, burrow further into the framework of our lives, and become
ubiquitous and generally indispensable, the methods by which we allow access to our individual slivers
of the Global Information Infrastructure (GII) escalate to considerable importance. Specifically, the
course of development and distribution of encryption technology is an obvious factor in how secure the
networks will be, in how United States businesses will fare in the GII, in how governments interact with
malefactors and each other, and in how private the individual can make her life, including, but not
limited to, the level of her ability to determine who she will include in her exercise of First Amendment
liberties.
(2) Of critical importance in the emergence of widely available encryption is the status of export laws
restricting, regulating, and criminalizing the export of high quality encryption software. These laws
classify encryption software as restricted items of trade at best and as munitions at worst. The laws were
passed during the Cold War in an attempt to slow enemy countries' access to technology. It is a
reasonably simple concept; primarily, an enemy's possession of encryption capabilities makes it harder
for us to spy on them, and, secondarily, if an enemy possesses our encryption techniques, it makes it
easier for them to figure out ways to spy on us.
(3) The peculiar importance of export laws stem from the global nature of information in general and
the GII in particular. First, there is a need for standards; if an encryption program does not yet exist and
is, in fact, being actively discouraged in a foreign country, it cannot be used in commerce with
companies in that country and, if the program cannot be used in commerce with foreign countries, there
is a strong possibility that, for reasons of efficiency, it will not be used domestically. This is especially
true if commerce becomes so globalized that one is just as likely to trade with someone halfway around

the world as one is to trade with someone across town. With information as a commodity, such trade is
not only entirely possible, it is probable. Second, networks are likely to become the primary means of
distributing software, particularly software which is intended to be made widely available. The fact that
networks used domestically are easily accessible from foreign countries means that strong encryption
which is legal and desirable for the use of citizens cannot be distributed effectively or efficiently because
the same networks which would enable distribution domestically are accessible by foreigners and,
therefore, anyone who made encryption available via these networks would run afoul of U.S. munitions
laws and export restrictions.
{4} In order to understand this issue, this paper will describe encryption generally, describe the export
laws by looking at their requirements and justifications, describe the objections and positions of U.S.
businesses, primarily from the software industry, with regard to these restrictions, describe the
government's attempt at a solution to the export impasse, primarily by looking at the Clipper debate,
and, finally describe the problems related to providing widespread, high quality encryption software
domestically caused by the export restrictions, primarily by looking at the matter of Phil Zimmerman
and his encryption program "Pretty Good Privacy."
I. A GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF CRYPTOGRAPHY
{5} Cryptography has been in use in one form or another for a very long time; Julius Caesar used a
simple system whereby every letter was to be replaced by a letter three places behind the original letter
in order to decrypt the message. L2] So "OBQOBXQ" becomes "RETREAT." The cipher or algorithm is
the function used for encryption or decryption, in Caesar's example, it is a substitution function based on
the number three; three being the key to the simple substitution algorithm.
{6} Caesar's was, of course, a very simple cipher, making the spy ciphers in cereal boxes appear
complex by comparison. Things have changed dramatically since then. Modem algorithms have key
lengths ranging in size from 40 to 128 bits. The difficulty of cracking a code by "guessing" the correct
key is approximately proportional to the number of possible key values. Since each bit contains two
possibilities (digital bits consisting of either a one or a zero), an eight bit key has 2 to the 8th power
possibilities or 256 possible keys. Therefore, the strength of an encryption algorithm, as a general rule,
grows exponentially with the number of bits available to it. [I]
{71 Essentially, there are two kinds of encryption systems that are used widely, "secret-key" systems and
"public-key" systems. In a secret-key system, the encryption key and the decryption key are the same. In
Caesar's system, the key is moving each letter three places in the alphabet. This system requires both the
sender and the receiver to possess the key in order to communicate which, in turn, means that a secure
system must exist by which to exchange such keys; this has traditionally been the weak link in secretkey systems. 4
{8}The most popular secret-key algorithm in use today is the Data Encryption Standard (DES) invented
by IBM in the mid-1970's with assistance from the National Security Agency (NSA). 5J Banks and
financial institutions have since standardized the 56 bit secret-key algorithm for electronic funds
transfers and other financial information. Though the technical details of DES and products
incorporating DES are available and produced world-wide, exports of products using DES for data
encryption are not allowed except to financial institutions or to subsidiaries owned at least 51% by U.S.
companies. IQ_
{9} RC2 and RC4 are "variable-key-size" ciphers which means that developers can make the keys long
or short; when used with longer keys, they are alternatives to DES. In 1992, the Software Publishers

Association (SPA) reached an agreement with the government to allow export of products using these
algorithms so long as their key size did not exceed 40 bits (DSA uses 56 bits), and, consequently,
foreign customers have refused to accept such products as replacements for DES. M

110) Public-key encryption was invented in the mid-1970s by two Stanford University scientists. They
did this through the use of two mathematically related keys. Although they are a matched pair, it is
infeasible to compute one key through the use of the other. Therefore, gone is the requirement that
sender and receiver share a common key. Instead, it is possible for the sender to have a public key which
is published in a directory while keeping his own private key. Ira S. Rubenstein describes a transaction
taking place using the RSA public-key system as follows:
{11) Imagine that Alice wants to send Bob an encrypted e-mail message. She looks up Bob's
public key in a public-key directory. To send Bob a private message, she scrambles her e-mail
with Bob's public key. Bob then decrypts Alice's message using his private key. The result: so
long as Bob keeps his private key private, no one else can read Alice's message to him.
(12) Alice can also digitally sign her message to Bob. She does so by encrypting the message with
her own private key. Bob receives the message and looks up Alice's public key in the directory. If
Bob can decrypt the message using Alice's public key, this confirms the mathematical relationship
between the two keys. If Alice's public key does not decrypt the message, Bob knows that the
message purportedly from Alice was not signed with Alice's key or that someone altered the
message during transmission. [8]
{13} RSA, named after the initials of its three inventors (Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard
Adelman), is the most popular public-key encryption algorithm and is a de facto worldwide standard for
digital signatures and privacy-enhanced e-mail. The algorithm for the RSA public-key system is freely
available abroad and exports of products using RSA for digital signatures are permitted regardless of
key size, but exports of software incorporating RSA is tightly restricted when used for privacyenhancing data encryption. L9A
II. ENCRYPTION EXPORT LAWS
{14) During the Cold War, the United States sought to restrict items which were specifically designed,
developed, configured, adapted, or modified for military application (defense articles) [L0] as well as
those items which were primarily useful for civilian purposes but which could be bent to military
purposes, known as "dual use" items in the relevant parlance. [L] In furtherance of this objective,
jurisdiction over the export of defense articles was given to the Office of Defense Trade Controls
(DTC). These defense articles are listed on the U.S. Munitions List (USML) which is part of the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). 121 "Information Security Systems and equipment,
cryptographic devices, software, and components specifically designed or modified therefore" including
"cryptographic systems or software with the capability of maintaining secrecy or confidentiality of
information" is controlled by Category XIII(b) of the USML. [l3]
(15) Dual-use encryption items fall into an exception, or, more properly, a frequently exercised waiver,
to DTC's jurisdiction. DTC does not exercise jurisdiction over technical data that qualifies for the
"public domain," 14] nor does it exercise jurisdiction over certain software DTC has agreed to transfer
to the Commerce Department sometimes categorically, and sometimes on a case-by-case basis.
Transferred encryption software falls under the jurisdiction of the Commerce Department's Bureau of
Export Administration (BXA) which controls the export of dual use items. [1

{16). For someone who desires to export encryption products, it is desirable to get one's product
transferred to BXA jurisdiction because otherwise export will have to be licensed as a munition under
ITAR. These munition licenses require an individual review for each end-user, there are no general
licenses, and DTC will not approve licenses for products destined for communist, former communist,
and terrorist nations. [161
f17) The primary way in which to get transferred to BXA jurisdiction is to get a favorable Commodity
Jurisdiction determination (CJ) CJ transfers fall into three main categories: automatic transfers,
specifically enumerated in Category XIII(b)(1); expedited transfers of mass market software programs
meeting specified requirements; and transfers based on a case-by-case review. {!j
* A. Automatic Transfers
{18} If cryptographic equipment performs any of the following functions and no others, it is
automatically transferred from DTC to BXA, furthermore, the ITAR no longer even requires a statement
from DTC verifying the transfer: 1) decryption only for copy-protected software; 2) bank or money
transactions; 3) cryptographic processing using analogue techniques in certain radio and fax equipment;
4) certain personalized smart cards; 5) access control devices such as ATMs 6) data authentication; 7)
fixed data compression or coding techniques; 8) set top decoders; 9) anti-virus software. L18
* B. Expedited Transfer of Mass Market Software

(19) In 1992, DTC set up procedures to speed up the transfers of mass market software into BXA
jurisdiction. "Mass market software" is defined as computer software that is available to the public via
sales from stock at retail selling points, by means of over-the-counter transactions, mail order
transactions, or telephone transactions. Such software must be designed for installation by the user
without further support of substance from the supplier. Expedited review means that a deternmnation
will be made within fifteen days; furthermore, if all of the expedited review criteria are met and the
software uses RC2 or RC4 algorithms of 40 bits or less, the exporter is entitled to a seven day
review. [19
(20) This rule provides a relatively convenient procedure for licensing software which meets the
criteria; however, a general rule of thumb is that algorithms exceeding 40 bits will not qualify for
expedited review. [20] C. Case by Case Review Certain mass market software products are eligible for
jurisdiction transfer by means of a case by case review if 1) they are designed to run on microcomputers;
2) they employ "non-standard cryptographic algorithms, not of strategic value;" and 3) encryption is not
the primary function. [21] Though neither BXA, DTC, nor NSA have ever explained what is meant by
"non-standard" or "non-strategic" and though DTC does not publish licensing decisions, "it is generally
understood that DTC will not approve licenses for DES-based encryption products except for financial
institutions (and such approvals are generally restricted to financial transactions) or subsidiaries of U.S.
companies." [221 NSA review of encryption using products under the case by case procedure could be
quite extensive so exporters have a strong incentive to meet the expedited review guidelines, including
the 40 bit limitation, in order to avoid lengthy delays.
121) Once encryption products are transferred to BXA jurisdiction, if they are designed for installation
by the user without further substantial support by the supplier, sold from stock at retail selling points,
and publicly available products (which are the only products which fit within the scope of this paper,
concerned as it is with businesses who presumably wish to sell their products widely as well as with the
everyday individuals who make up the public to whom these products must be available), then they are
almost always eligible for a general license, making them exportable to all destinations except for the

pariah nations of North Korea, Cuba, Libya, Iraq, Serbia, Montenegro, Iran, and Syria. [23]
(22) There are, therefore, many administrative hurdles which must be cleared in order to be permitted to
export products employing encryption. The primary hurdle is avoiding DTC jurisdiction so as to be able
to license one's products generally rather than having to obtain licenses for each end-user, and, the
primary way to do this is to keep one's algorithm under 40 bits. Violating the export restrictions can
result in a maximum criminal penalty of $1 million and ten years in prison [24] or a maximum civil
penalty of $500,000 and a three year export ban. [25
(231 The justifications for these bans tend to be inadequate when they are justified at all. The NSA, the
agency primarily responsible for export restrictions, is fairly tight lipped about its rationale for
maintaining the export restrictions; this should be expected to a certain extent, since it was only recently
that the NSA admitted its existence at all. However, according to a report by the Association for
Computer Machinery (ACM), the goals of U.S. export restrictions are: (i) to limit foreign availability of
cryptographic systems of strategic capability, namely, those capable of resisting concerted cryptanalytic
attack; (ii) to limit foreign availability of cryptographic systems of sufficient strength to present a
serious barrier to traffic selection or the development of standards that interfere with traffic selection by
making the messages in broad classes of traffic (fax, for example) difficult to distinguish; and (iii) to use
the export-control process as a mechanism for keeping track of commercially produced cryptosystems,
whether U.S. or foreign, that NSA may at some time be called upon to break. [26
HI. OBJECTIONS BY THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY
{24) As one can imagine, businesses which desire to produce software featuring cryptography also, as a
general rule, wish to export that software expanding their market as well as the amount of money they
can make. It has only recently become an issue due to the fact that cryptography has not been practical
or in much demand in the past. Prior to the last decade or so, encryption was almost exclusively
relegated to the murky world of espionage and traffic analysis. Since then, the advent of cheaper
processing power, increasing use of computer networks, and increasing production and export of
software have pushed the issue of encryption export regulations into the mainstream of business
technology. [27]
125) Speculations about how much money is actually being lost by businesses due to export restrictions
vary; some say six to nine billion dollars, [28] while others say that six to nine billion dollars is the total
profit made by all software exports, of which presumably only a portion would have incorporated
encryption; [29] the most lucid assessment comes from Electronic Frontier Foundation co-founder and
cyberspace commentator John Perry Barlow: "[w]hile it's impossible to set a credible figure on what the
loss might be, it's high." t30] This seems to be the more sensible take on the matter since numbers tend
to get crunched around to the benefit of the person who happens to be crunching with a consistency that
impairs credibility and, furthermore, when discussing what a policy should be it makes little sense to
rely on the numbers of the past rather than projecting the numbers of the future which are likely to grow
exponentially. [31]
(26) The software industry's incentive for wanting to remove export controls is clear, it wants to make
money which is exactly what businesses are supposed to do. Despite the obvious nature of the incentive,
their arguments in support of deregulation are fairly compelling.
(27) First, the export controls do not work. This is evidenced by the fact that foreign countries are
getting encryption technology and manufacturing encryption products despite the controls. A study by
the software industry reported that a total of 20 foreign countries are manufacturing 215 hardware,

software, and combination products that use encryption. Of these 215 products, 84 use the DES
algorithm which was invented in the United States with the help of the NSA and which was subject to
the export controls. 32] Furthermore, the law itself is frequently breached--cryptographic programs go
out over networks, are carried out in laptops or secured telephones, or are sold to foreign nationals in
U.S. software and computer stores. [3
(281 Second, most other countries do not regulate encryption software which contributes to the
ineffectiveness of U.S. controls and places U.S. companies at a disadvantage. [3A European countries
have few restrictions on their software exports [35], especially Germany, France, and Switzerland. .[16
Britain freely allows export of mass market encryption software as well as encryption software for use in
banking; export of encryption software for military activities is, however, restricted. [L7] Even Russia,
the old cold war enemy, provides in its new constitution that governmental restrictions on the use of
cryptography is forbidden. [38]
{29) As a result, U.S. companies fear that they will fall behind in what stands to be a large market.
Based on one survey, one-third of software consumers said that "they specifically look for encryption
capabilities when buying software and would consider purchasing foreign software otherwise less
desirable if that software offered data security not available in a U.S. software program." [39] And, in
fact, importation of strong cryptography is not illegal. [40] Taking action on the matter, the sotware
industry has put pressure on the Clinton Administration to change the export laws they consider to be
damaging, unreasonable, and unrealistic. [411
(30) In response, the Clinton Administration has proposed Clipper, a plan by which the government
would hold its own set of encryption keys "in escrow," thereby allowing it to decrypt communications
when the need arises while still providing high strength encryption. The business community widely
rejected the Clipper proposal, largely based upon the sound logic that it is doubtful whether foreigners
would be eager to buy products which would allow the U.S. government to eavesdrop on them.
(31) Recently, the Clinton administration was proposing a liberalization of controls allowing exports xof
products with encryption keys of up to 64 bits (as opposed to the current de facto 40 bit restriction) [42
as long as the keys were placed in escrow. Companies indicated a possible interest in a system
employing corporate key-escrow rather than government key-escrow. 143] Specifically, in August of
1995, executives from eight software manufacturers wrote a letter to Vice President Gore saying, "We
request that the administration immediately adopt a policy that allows the export of strong cryptography
with a commercial key escrow system that provides appropriate back-up access for individuals,
corporations, and governments. This capability should be tied to data recovery or escrow centers
managed by commercial organizations with access by government agencies supported through existing
search warrant mechanisms." They also call for permission to export "generally available" software
programs with data encryption capabilities employing DES or other algorithms with similar
strengths. t4
(32) Finally, there is concern that beyond crippling the encryption software industry specifically, the
export laws are going a fair way toward dampening the growth of commerce in general. Sally Katzen,
chair of the Information Infrastructure Task Force's (IITF) Privacy Working Group and its Security
Issues Forum, said that people want "confidence that their privacy is respected, that their intellectual
property rights are protected, and that their security is effective." Discussion in the forum indicated that
a lack of confidence in the networks would be inspired by unease about security of credit ratings, bank
accounts, contents of messages, and security in general. If people do not have confidence in the security
of the network, the infrastructure will grow much more slowly if it grows at all. [45]
133) The business community, therefore, stands with fair unity in opposition to the export restrictions

placed on encryption products. The opposition stems from the fact that the restrictions are costing
businesses money now, are likely to cost them more money in the future, place them at a disadvantage to
foreign competitors, do not seem to be doing the job which such restrictions were designed for, and
seem to be unnecessarily hindering the growth of the GII if not jeopardizing it all together.
IV. THE CLIPPER PROPOSAL--STRONG, EXPORTABLE CRYPTOGRAPHY?
{34} In an apparent attempt to resolve the tension between the desire to use and export products with
strong cryptographic capabilities and the desire to keep from aiding those who would wish ill to the
United States of America, on April 16, 1993, the White House announced the Escrowed Encryption
Initiative, "a voluntary program to improve security and privacy of telephone communications while
meeting the legitimate needs of law enforcement." [A6]
{35} The Escrowed Encryption Initiative put forth the Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES), a standard
which uses the Skipjack algorithm and is incorporated into the Clipper chip which possesses the key
escrow feature. The Skipjack algorithm is to remain classified, ostensibly to enhance its security. 147]
{36} EES works as follows: If two people wish to communicate (for instance by telephone) with EES
secured transmissions, both must have a phone equipped with the Clipper chip. The devices establish an
80-bit "session key" and pass this to their chips which, in turn, encrypt the session key with the deviceunique key. Each device-unique key has an associated chip identification. Both the chip identification
and the encrypted session key are placed in a Law Enforcement Access Field (LEAF). The LEAF is sort
of an identification tag that accompanies the encrypted data of the rest of the stream of
communication. [48] As was mentioned, every Clipper chip has a device-unique key; upon manufacture,
a copy of that key is split into two components each of which is given to a separate governmental
escrow agent. [9] Users of Clipper do not need to be aware of any of these details, they simply use their
phones as always. [50]
{37} In order to decrypt a message, communications must be passed through a decrypt processor by law
enforcement officials in order to determine whether or not they are Clipper communications, and, if so,
what the chip identification is. Next, law enforcement officials must request the device unique key
associated with the chip identification from the two escrow agents possessing the parts of the device
unique key. Third, the device unique key is used to decrypt the session key located in the LEAF. Fourth,
the session key is used to decrypt the body of the message. i511
{38} In addition to the primary purpose of allowing law enforcement officials access to encrypted
conversations, Clipper advocates suggest that it would have other beneficial uses. Individuals and
businesses would have a way to retrieve data should they happen to lose their key. Also offered as a
boon of Clipper is the ability of employers to crack the encryption of employees when those employees
are using company computers and networks in order to embezzle or commit fraud. [52]
{39) Of course these "extras" of Clipper point to a disturbing question. What exactly are the standards
by which people are to be able to obtain the keys. If, as was suggested, businesses can obtain keys to
retrieve data, it is clear that a warrant is not strictly and without exception required in order to obtain the
key. This is, in fact indicated by the language of the Clipper proposal where it said that in order to obtain
keys from escrow agents, law enforcement agencies need to present evidence of"lawful authority." In
all, the government has been evasive about questions as to who will have access to the ability to
eavesdrop and as to precisely what constitutes "lawful authority." [5]
{40} In fact, there were many concerns about Clipper raised by the Digital Privacy and Security

Working Group, a group including DEC, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Sun, MCI, Microsoft, Apple, and
AT&T. Some of the questions sent to the White House by the Working Group were:
" Who would the escrow agents be?
" What are Clipper's likely economic impacts, especially in regard to export of American digital
products?
" Why is its encryption algorithm secret and why should the public have confidence in a
government-derived algorithm that can't be privately tested?
* Why is Clipper/Skipjack being ram-rodded into adoption as a government standard before
completion of an over-all review of U.S. policies on cryptography?
" Why are the NSA, FBI, and NIST stone-walling Freedom of Information inquiries about
Clipper/Skipjack? (In fact, NSA's response has been, essentially, "So? Sue us.")
" Assuming Clipper/Skipjack becomes a standard, what happens if the escrow depositories are
compromised?
" Wouldn't these depositories also become targets of opportunity for any criminal or terrorist
organization that wanted to disrupt U.S. law enforcement?
" Since the chip transmits its serial number at the beginning of each connection, why wouldn't it
render its owner's activities highly visible through traffic analysis (for which government needs no
warrant)?
" Why would a foreign customer buy a device that exposed his conversations to examination by the
government of the United States?
" Does the deployment and use of the chip possibly violate the 1st, 4th, and 5th Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution?
" In its discussions of Clipper/Skipjack, the government often uses the phrase "lawfully authorized
electronic surveillance." What, exactly, do they mean by this?
" Is it appropriate to insert classified technology into either the public communications network or
into the general suite of public technology standards? [54j
{41} Apparently, the White House was not particularly responsive to the questions. Barlow, co-founder
of the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) which was one of the members of the working group,
describes the responses as follows:

Still unnamed, undescribed, and increasingly unimaginable were the escrow agents.
Questions about the inviolability of the depositories were met with something like, "don't
worry, they'll be secure. Trust us." There seemed a lot of that in Podesta's responses. While
the government had convened a panel of learned cryptologists to examine the classified
Skipjack algorithm, it had failed to inspire much confidence among the crypto
establishment, most of whom were disinclined to trust anything they couldn't wack at
themsleves. At the least, most people felt a proper examination would take longer than the
month or so the panel got. After all, it took fifteen years to find a hairline fissure in DES.
But neither Podesta (the White House spokesperson) nor any other official explained why it
had seemed necessary to use a classified military algorithm for civilian purposes. Nor were
the potential economic impacts addressed. Nor were the concerns about traffic analysis laid
to rest. {55J
(42) Met with questions of this nature and widespread objections by those who were supposed to
embrace Clipper, the government withdrew from the melee, at least for a little while. As noted above, as
of the fall of 1995, the government has resumed its key-escrow advances with discussions with the
software industry reminding it that key-escrowed products would be easily exportable and also at least
listening to suggestions of a corporate escrow system. As yet, no new action has been taken. [56]

V. PRETTY GOOD PROTECTION AND PRETTY SERIOUS PROBLEMS
f43) Quite a bit of controversy has arisen from an RSA-based, public-key encryption program called
PGP (short for Pretty Good Protection) written by Phil Zimmermann. Zimmermann wrote the program
in response to Federal threats to crack down on the distribution of encryption software. [57] It was
subsequently uploaded to the Internet by Kelly Goen in May of 1991, making it widely available in the
United States and accessible from other nations. Then, in 1993, Assistant U.S. Attorney Bill Keane
initiated an investigation based on possible charges of illegal exportation of a munition. [L8 In
furtherance of its investigation, a federal grand jury in San Jose, California issued subpoenas to Viacrypt
and Austin Code Works, two companies involved in the production and distribution of commercial PGP,
requiring them to supply all correspondence and records related to the international distribution of PGP.
Both companies assert that they have no plans to sell their products internationally. 5_]
{44} The case raises the issue of what constitutes an export. Zimmermann created the program because
he wanted to make privacy an option for individuals using computer networks and related technologies,
on the other hand, he did not upload the program to the Internet himself. And, even if he were
responsible for the uploading, it is difficult to say whether uploading a product to the Internet constitutes
an export. After all, the program still resides in a computer within the United States. Nevertheless, it is
surpassingly easy for someone in another country to access Internet sites and bring PGP into their
country, thereby moving strong encryption across borders. A major problem with holding persons liable
for export violations when they upload encryption products to the Internet is that it would deny citizens
of the United States an extremely efficient way of obtaining high quality encryption, something no one
has seriously proposed outlawing yet.
CONCLUSION
(45) In the pursuit of Cold War objectives, the United States adopted a policy of limiting the exports of
products it considered militarily dangerous for hostile nations to possess. Among these were encryption
techniques and products. Until recently, however, this was of practically no interest to anyone except
governments of sovereign nations engaged in the games that they play. However, with the advent of
cheap and widespread computer processing power linked to communications networks, encryption
technology has become of great interest to computer users and the companies who would supply them.
(46) In the course of hunting profit, U.S. businesses have requested that the government either eliminate
or modify the export bans on encryption software. In favor of this position, they have pointed out that
the encryption restrictions are largely ineffectual. Despite the restrictions, businesses of foreign nations
are engaged in a robust trade of a wide variety of encryption products, many of which use techniques
which are still restricted by the munitions laws. Furthermore, the laws are likely to become even more
ineffectual as the communications networks expand, and the genie will escape from the bottle with more
and more frequency.
(47) Other countries do not employ much in the way of encryption bans themselves. This demonstrates
the viability of lacking encryption export controls while still keeping the national security viable as well
as suggesting a grave potential for U.S. companies losing their edge in the market. What is more, the
export restrictions tend to hinder the establishment of a standard by which commerce can be conducted
internationally over the GII. Until such a standard is established, confidence in network security will be
limited and full advantage will not be taken of the money making potential of the Information
Infrastructure.
(48) In an inadequate attempt to resolve the tension between businesses' need for security and the

government's unease with the concept of not being able to eavesdrop when it feels it needs to, the
Clinton Administration proposed Clipper despite the fact that it has serious flaws. First, it is incredibly
unlikely to answer the export concerns of U.S. business. Foreigners would be of questionable
intelligence were they content to employ encryption techniques which let the U.S. government listen
without detection. Second, if Clipper is truly voluntary, U.S. citizens are unlikely to employ Clipper
encryption since, as Barlow put it, "trusting the government with your privacy is like having a Peeping
Tom install your window blinds." 60f_]
{49} The export controls on encryption start to make more sense if one takes a look at them from a
slightly more paranoid perspective. Since the controls do not seem to be doing any appreciable degree of
good as far as keeping encryption out of the hands of foreigners, it makes sense to look at the other side
of the coin; what are export controls doing to keep encryption out of the hands of U.S. citizens?
{50} When PGP, an encryption program the U.S. government has a good deal of trouble cracking, was
made widely available to U.S. citizens via the Internet, the U.S. government began to come down on its
creator, an action surely likely to inhibit other would-be providers of high quality encryption. At
approximately the same time, the government announces Clipper, a system designed to give domestic
law enforcement officials and espionage agencies alike access to private communications. Meanwhile,
the export controls continue to chill U.S. companies' development and sales of high quality encryption
by making it more efficient to "dumb-down" their encryption capabilities in order to be able to sell one
product both domestically as well as abroad.
{51) In crafting policies and in deciding which laws to propose, which laws to keep, and which laws to
do away with, lawmakers, businesses, public interest groups, and everybody else for that matter, would
be well advised to attempt to raise their head out of the muck and their day to day concerns and consider
a bigger picture, particularly with regard to the digital technologies and how they change the rules of day
to day concerns..
(52) One consideration is the design of the Internet and similar networks. Originally the Department of
Defense was searching for a communications mechanism which would maintain the communication
flow in the event of a nuclear strike which destroyed major communications hubs. The answer,
essentially, was to create a web which routed information around troubled spots. Looked at in one way,
encryption restrictions could be viewed as a communication trouble spot. This could produce at least
two outcomes. First, the restrictions are simply by-passed, encryption flows around them, getting it to
everyone who wants it. This would suggest that the law is impotent, create a glaring inequity in the
relatively rare instances where the law is enforced, and generally contribute to an unhealthy disrespect
for the law. Or second, the U.S. government is so successful at sealing off the country that encryption
does not get out of the country. However, this could make the entire nation a sort of trouble spot in the
network causing information to route around it. This is not to say that information ceases to come into
the country necessarily, only that the volume decreases. For example, it could be the result that.only
information that needs to be secure has the tendency to route around the United States since our high
quality encryption is incompatible or at least it takes more work to make it compatible and, therefore,
safety and efficiency dictate that transmissions be routed around the United States.
{53) Whatever the exact effects of such an avoidance, they are unlikely to be desirable for the health of
either the economy of or the free flow of information within the United States. Another concern is the
relative danger of erring on the side of privacy verses that of erring on the side of authority. While
dashing headlong into the grip of technology which is not fully understood, indeed which possibly
cannot be understood without first experiencing it (and even then maybe not), we are bound to make
mistakes. The hazards of unchecked privacy are much like ogres, witches, and monsters under the bed;
decidedly fierce, but hard to point to definitively because they are rarely if ever seen. The hazards of

increased governmental control, on the other hand, have been seen in every age of humanity. The
prudent course would be to err on the side of privacy since, if the costs outweigh the benefits, the forces
of authority can be counted upon to gather power into their hands. It is doubtful whether the forces of
privacy could be counted upon to successfully remove power from the side of authority were the
positions reversed.
{54} A final concern to be noted (at least for the purposes of this paper) is the bias of the network. Two
of a digital network's tendencies are to replicate data and to spread it widely. Ultimately, these
tendencies will probably prove insurmountable by those who would desire to keep information between
themselves and one or few others (though the person wishing to keep information to himself should still
prove successful). [U However, encryption could at least prove to be a stalling tactic to prevent total
disclosure until our society is at least a bit more ready for it. This means that encryption would make it
so that the original information is only in a readable form in the receiver's and possibly the sender's
systems; though the receiver would find it easy to transmit the information where he would. At the very
least, encryption would prevent the information from lying dormant in a useful form in any computer the
message happened to have bounced through between sender and receiver. However, it is doubtful that,
in the long run, encryption will prove an effective adversary of the digital network's ability and tendency
to replicate and distribute information. In order to read information, the human receiver has to be able to
decrypt that information and, once decrypted, it can be sent anywhere. It will be hard to know which
information has been safely destroyed and which information has been scattered into the network. So
perhaps, and this is nearly unadulterated speculation, our privacy will revert to almost as little as we had
in the tribal village; but, maybe encryption can battle this tendency until we are more used to the idea
and its implications.
{55} In conclusion, therefore, the laws restricting the export of high quality encryption may once have
served its stated and legitimate purpose of enhancing U.S. security, but due to the replicative nature of
software, the increased volume of commerce, and the wide availability of substantial computing power,
it is no longer feasible to keep encryption out of the hands of entities powerful enough to be considered
a foreign threat to the United States. Since the laws are not working for their stated purposes, it would be
distasteful in the extreme to maintain them for the unsavory purpose of keeping high quality encryption
out of the possession of U.S. citizens without at least having the courtesy to notify them of that policy.
The United States government has enough problems without cheapening its credibility any further than
has already been done. Whatever the reasons for maintaining the restrictions, they have the effect of
putting U.S. companies at a disadvantage in an expanding and important market which is likely to grow
in coming years. Furthermore, restricting high quality encryption has the effect of hampering the GII, an
artifact which is likely to provide the engine of considerable economic activity. To say the least, it is a
strange course of action to be followed by a country whose business, as Calvin Coolidge once said, is
business.
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